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The reallocationofresources is one ofthe mainimpacts of tradeliberalizationpro-
cesses. In the case of manufacturing industries resources will be reallocated from
import–competing sectors to export–oriented sectors. This paper studies the ef-
fects that a more open economic environment has had on the entry conditions for
foreignanddomesticﬁrmsinUruguayanmanufacturingindustries. Weﬁndsignif-
icant differencesin the behavior offoreignand domestic ﬁrms, both when they are
incumbentsorwhentheyactaspotentialentrants. Ingeneral, foreignﬁrmsseemto
be more succesful in applying entry deterring strategies, due to advantages in for-
eign markets, deeper ﬁnancial resources or better technological capabilities. They
also appear to be moreresponsive to entryconditions when they face theprospects
of entering a given industry.1 Introduction
Industryevolution can be described by the ﬂow of ﬁrms, that is entry and exit pro-
cesses into different economic activities. These processes are likely to be inﬂu-
enced by changes in the economic environment. In the case of economies with a
high degree of protection, entry barriers may be an important factorin shaping do-
mestic industrial structure. For open economies instead, import competition may
hamper the importance of entry barriers at the domestic level.
One of the main features of economic policy in Uruguay, as in other South-
american countries, was an import–substitution strategy based on strong foreign
trade restrictions. After reaching levels of unparalleled prosperity in the region
during the ﬁrst half of the century, the Uruguayan economy stagnated and entered
into a period of increasing monetary and ﬁscal instability, which peaked at the be-
ginning of the 1970s. The military regime that took power in June 1973 adopted
initially an accommodating economic policy towards the oil price shock of 1973,
but had no success. A serious balance of payment crisis developed, and this trig-
gered the appointment of a new economic team in July 1974, which started a trade
liberalization program. The program included the elimination of quantitative re-
strictions, the gradual reduction of tariffs (with programmed stages at 1980, 1981
and 1982)and the liberalizationof capitalﬂows and foreignexchange transactions
(for a detailed account of this program and an assessment of its effects on the al-
location of resources see Favaro and Spiller, 1991). Liberalization policies were
accompanied by market deregulation for a signiﬁcant number of economic activi-
ties. The programwas stalled in1982, while the economy was in a deep recession.
After the return of a democratic regime in 1984, a programof gradual tariffreduc-
tion was implemented.
One of the main impacts of trade liberalization processes is the reallocation of
resourcesintheeconomy. Inthecase ofmanufacturingindustriesresourceswillbe
reallocated fromimport–competinginto export–orientedsectors. Export–oriented
industries should become therefore more dynamic, with an associated increase in
proﬁt opportunities. This in turn will cause an increase of ﬁrm turnover due to a
reduction in the importance of entry barriers.
Incumbent and potential entrant ﬁrms can be either domestic or foreign. They
can adopt differentstrategies both as domestic competitorsor foreigncompetitors.
It is not clear which kind of ﬁrms will be at an advantage in terms of the entry bar-
riers that they face. If multinationals can operate at a larger scale, it is clear that
they may be more likely to enjoy cost advantages over domestic ﬁrms, but domes-
tic ﬁrms may enjoy other kinds of advantages such as a better strategic position in
the industry. Financial and technological aspects seem to be also in favor of for-
1eign ﬁrms.
Domestic and foreign ﬁrms should respond differently both to the proﬁt op-
portunities created in export–oriented industries and in the contraction of import–
competing industries. The gradual opening of the economy implied that domes-
tic industries were increasingly involved in competition both internally and in re-
gional markets. Regional competition in turn implied a process of learning in re-
gional protected markets.
In this paper we use data from Uruguayan manufacturing industries to study
if there are signiﬁcant differences in the behavior of domestic and foreign ﬁrms at
a four–digit industry level. We estimate the different speed and easiness of entry,
after proposing a simple model of entry. The data used correspond to Uruguayan
manufacturing industries 1. Despite the fact that we can observe only a cross–
section ofﬁrms fora givenyear, 1988, we have informationaboutthe age of ﬁrms,
allowing us to identify ﬁrms surviving the trade liberalization process, as well as
proﬁt histories for each four-digit industry. We use this information to describe
and interpret differences in behavior of foreign and domestic ﬁrms, as a response
to the trade liberalization process.
Therearesimilarstudies forindustrializedcountries, suchas Geroski(1991)or
SleuwagenandDehandschutter(1991),butthisissuehasreceivedlessattentionfor
developing economies. This paper also presents a new technique to approximate
entry from cohorts of surviving ﬁrms.
The paper has the following structure: We start in section 2 presenting a de-
scription of the Uruguayan manufacturing industry and the role of foreign ﬁrms.
In section 3 we propose the theoretical model of entry used in this study. In sec-
tion 4 we formulate the theoretical model of entry in terms of observables and we
present and interpret the estimated coefﬁcients. Concluding remarks can be found
in section 5.
2 Foreign and domestic ﬁrms
In Table 1 we present summary statistics for our sample of Uruguayan industrial
ﬁrms. A more detailed description of this sample can be found in Appendix B.
The average industry analyzed in this sample in 1988 had a clear export orien-
tationand anintermediatedegreeofconcentration(halfofthe sales isconcentrated
1We use the Census of Manufacturers for Uruguay of 1988, that contains detailed microeco-
nomic information. This information is complemented with the Annual Industrial Survey to con-
struct a time series of average proﬁts for each industry.
2Table 1: Descriptive statistics for Uruguayan manufacturing industries (1988)
Variable Mean Coefﬁcient of Minimum Maximum
Variation
Average Size
(thousand US $) 943 7.4 66 491,570
Productivity (thousand US $
of gross production
per worker) 30 0.9 6 203
Capital/labor
ratio 13 2.1 0.5 198.7
C4 Index of
Concentration (%) 55.5 0.5 12.4 100.0
Number of ﬁrms
per industry 69 2.0 1 1084
Average age
of ﬁrms (years) 15 0.4 5 61
3in the four biggest ﬁrms) 2.
Firms in the Uruguayan manufacturingsector have an average age of 15 years,
and it can be said that most of them are quite young, despite the fact that there are
someﬁrmsdating backto thenineteenthcentury. Their size is quiteheterogeneous
but the average size is small (the average value of gross production is around one
million US dollars). Average capital/worker ratio is 13,000 US dollars.
The ﬁrst six industries with respect to its share in total Gross Value Added
are 3111 (meat products), 3211 (spinning, weaving and ﬁnishing textiles), 3530
(petroleum reﬁneries), 3116 (grain mill products), 3220 (wearing apparel, except
footwear) and 3112 (dairy products) industries). With the exception of petroleum
reﬁneries (a public monopoly) the rest are industries with a clear export orienta-
tion.
With respect to the age of ﬁrms in this set of industries where Uruguay has
comparativeadvantages, it can be noticed that, at the dairyproducts and grainmill
industries, ﬁrms are older than average and entry is lower.
There is another set of industries with export orientation and an intermediate
importance in total Gross Value Added. These are 3121 (food products n.e.c.),
3233 (whips and riding crops), 3114 (canning, preserving and processing of ﬁsh,
crustaceaandsimilarfoods),3521(paints,varnishesandlacquers),3240(footwear
except rubber or plastic) and 3213 (knitted and crocheted products). These are in
general industries with younger ﬁrms than the previous group. Total number of
ﬁrms and average size are also smaller in this group.
Industries where imports are importantare 3843 (motorvehicles), 3522 (drugs
andmedicines),3560(plasticproductsn.e.c.), 3512(fertilizersandpesticides), and
3511(basic industrialchemicals exceptfertilizers). These areolderindustries than
industries in the previous group and with a greater variability of average sizes.
A third set of industries is formed by industries mainly oriented towards do-
mestic markets and with small import competition. Industries in this group are
3117 (bakery products), 3134 (soft drinks, mineral water), 3411 (pulp, paper and
paperboard),3819 (fabricatedmetal products except machineryand equipment n.-
e.c.), 3140 (tobacco products), 3523 (soap and cleaning preparations, perfumes,
cosmetics and other toilet preparations), 3559 (rubber products n.e.c.), 3133 (malt
liquors and malt) and 3118 (sugar factories and reﬁneries).
Inthisgroupofnon-specializedindustriestherearetwotypes ofindustries. On
the one hand one set of industries (soft drinks, paper, rubber, beer and sugar) with
larger average size and older ﬁrms, with the highest concentration indices within
2The sample includes ﬁrms with more than ﬁve workers. These are the ﬁrms included in the
1988 Census of Manufacturers.
4the manufacturing sector. In these industries there is almost no entry. The second
type shows a more competitive structure with more ﬁrms of smaller average size,
less concentration and higher entry.
The rest of industries not considered in this description, with weights on total
Gross Value Added smaller than 1 %, is characterized by fewer and younger ﬁrms
and smaller average size. Firms in this group are also generally non specialized
and face imports in their markets.
This general description allows us to trace a brief history of the Uruguayan
industry. The largest ﬁrms belong to industries oriented to the domestic market
and not facing high competition fromimports. The most extreme examples are to-
bacco, the beer and soft drinks industries. Even with the trade liberalization pro-
cess going on, there are still strong protection mechanisms in place. Industries
where imports are important have a smaller average size than the previous group.
Several industries in this group can be traced to the period of import–substitution
(decades of 1940 and 1950), with very limited entry in the last decades. These
are also industries where the participation of foreign capital is important. Some of
these industries are export oriented in certain production lines, for instance the car
industry, basic chemicals, plastics and fertilizers.
Exporting industries can be divided in two groups. On the one hand there are
industriesthattraditionallyhavehadcomparativeadvantages, such as textile, meat
processing, dairy products, leather or grain mill product industries. These are in-
dustrieswithahigherthanaveragesizeandyoungerﬁrmsifwecomparethemwith
the previous set of industries. The other group, sea products, ceramics, knit tex-
tiles, is composed by even youngerﬁrmsof a smalleraverage size and clearexport
orientation.
We deﬁne foreign ﬁrms in a discrete way: if more than 50 % of assets are held
by non–resident owners, then we consider a ﬁrm as foreign. The importance of
foreignﬁrmsinmanufacturingindustries, measuredas shareongross valueofpro-
duction, is increasing during the 1980s. It increased from10 % in 1980 to 25 % in
1988. At the end of this decade foreign ﬁrms represented a 5 % of manufacturing
ﬁrms, 16 % of the labor force and 23 % of exports.
In Table 2 we show the industries at a 3–digit level whith the highest partici-
pation of foreign ﬁrms. Foreign ﬁrms are in general of larger size than domestic
ﬁrms. Entry of foreign ﬁrms was especially important during the period 1931 to
1955, as shown by the survivors in 1988. Entry of foreign ﬁrms is smaller during
the 1970s and 1980s, but the importance of foreign ﬁrms is increasing. Foreign
ﬁrms that entered before 1973 are usually oriented towards the domestic market.
These were ﬁrms that usually entered with the objective of subtuting imports to
supply the domestic demand. Foreign ﬁrms that entered after 1973 usually have a
5Table 2: Industries with the highest foreign participation
Participation
in gross value
Industry SIC–code of production
Beverages 313 72%
Pharmaceuticals and medicines 352 67%
Food 312 66%
Basic chemical 352 55%
Machinery 383 43%
Metal products 381 39%
Iron and steel 371 35%
Textile 321 34%
higher export orientation.
3 The Model of Entry
We base our analysis on Orr (1974) simple model of entry. Entry in industry j at
time t depends on the difference between expected proﬁts πe
jt and bj, the proﬁts
that would be obtained in the limit when the industry is in equilibrium and there is
no more scope for further entry or exit 3. It is assumed that bj, which can also be
deﬁned as the height of entry barriers, depends on different factors such as market
size, growth, product differentiation or concentration. Entry can be thought as a




where µjt is a stochastic perturbation that collects the unexplained factors of the
entry process 4, and it is assumed that γ and the entry barriers may vary over i =
f,d, f being foreign and d being domestic. In other words, the estimated coefﬁ-
cients of the model will be allowed to vary according to the type of ﬁrm.
3This model neglects the fact that some industries may be composed by producers of differen-
tiated products and may therefore show a substantial departure of the relation of excess proﬁts to
entry. Thisa well–knownshort-come ofthiskindofmodels, thatisnotveryimportantifindustries
are classiﬁed in fairly homogeneous productiongroups, as discussed in Geroski (1991b) , chapter
3.
4In Geroski (1991a) it is shown that equation (1) can be deduced as the reduced form of a dy-
namic program for proﬁt maximization.
6For a small economy with a developing industry and increasing international
exposure, domestic ﬁrms will behave as price–followers in international markets.
Entry and exit could then be governed by the behavior of ﬁrms in a fringe of do-
mestic ﬁrms with proﬁtand growthpatterns determined by their degree of interna-
tionalexposure. Thisimpliesthatpotentialentrantsbehaviorisdeterminedbothby
structural characteristics of domestic industries and by proﬁt opportunities in in-
ternationalmarkets. These considerations lead us to formulatean empiricalmodel
ofentrythat includesinternationaland domesticfactors. Based onequation (1)we












where ENTRYjt is a measure of entry, PROFIT
e
jt is a measure of expected proﬁts,
Xk are industry characteristics, associated with barriers to entry and to other struc-
tural parameters that determine long-run limit proﬁts, d stands for domestic and f
stands for foreign.
There arethreeseparate issues toaddress in orderto specifyan estimableequa-
tion. Firstitisnecessary toestablish whichkindofentrymeasurewewilluse. Sec-
ond, since expected proﬁtsare unobservable, itis necessary touse a proxyvariable
orestimateexpectedproﬁtsfrompastinformationonproﬁts. Andthird, somevari-
ables have to be proposed in order to estimate the height of barriers to entry. We
will analyze these three issues separately.
3.1 Measures of Entry
Two factors determinethe choice of a measure of entry. First, the goal of the study
is to analyze the determinants of market expansion on different types of entrants,
sothatourmeasureofentryshouldbeeitherentryratesormarketpenetrationrates.
Secondly, data availability will also drive our choice.
In our case, it is not possible to construct a measure of gross entry and exit,
since we only have information about the stock of ﬁrms in each industry for the
year 1988, and some information on past proﬁts and date of birth for surviving
ﬁrms. If the analysis is restricted to the net increase in aggregate supply for each
industry, a measure of net entry (gross entry minus gross exit) will give a good
approximation of the increase in competition caused by new ﬁrms.
7We propose a measure of net entry based on the survivors for a given year. We
exploita well known empirical fact: most of the ﬁrms that enter an industry exit in
a very short period of time 5. Therefore recent survivors are a good approximation
of net entrants in recent periods, since most of the ﬁrms that exit in recent years
will be ﬁrms that had entered in those same recent years.
The available information allows us to express the total number of ﬁrms as a
stock of ﬁrms with their dates of birth. Denote by St the stock of survivors at date
t. Recent and past survivors are related as follows:






t−k are net entrants during the period (t−k,t) and GEt
t−k are gross exits
during the same period of ﬁrms that existed before t − k. This equation simply
states that the stock of survivors is updated through recent ﬁrm turnover and exit
of old ﬁrms. If the latter is small, as we assume, recent and past survivors allow
us to approximate net entry.
The farther apart we go, the less likely that the number of recent survivors is
equal to the number of net entrants at any period of time. Instead if we take the
number of a recent generation of survivors, we can be fairly conﬁdent that it will
be a good approximation of net entry in the last period. We choose a three-year
period to compute net entry and obtain annual net entry as the average observed
over this three-year period. Consequently, the followingis our measure of the rate
of net entry (Et) for the year 1988:
E1988 =
(F1986 + F1987 + F1988)/3
S1985
(4)
where Ft are ﬁrms surviving from year t and S1985 is the stock of survivors from
1985 or previous years.
If net entry is negative, or in other words if more ﬁrms exit than enter forsome
year, our measure of entry will be zero. This could happen if gross exit from pre-
vious periods, Gk
t−k, is not negligible for some industry. Therefore we will have to
correct our estimation for left–censoring of our entry measure, since negative net
entry (positive net exit) will be censored to zero.
In Table 3 we present average entry ﬁgures. Entry rates computed by the me-
thod suggested above show a striking similarity with studies for other countries 6.
Entrants are usually smaller than existing ﬁrms, showing that penetration rates are
5See for instance Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988)forempirical evidence about thisstyl-
ized fact.
6For a survey see Geroski (1991b).
8Table 3: Average entry and proﬁts for incumbents and entrants
Entry rate 0.052 1.0 0 0.25
Proﬁt rate of
Incumbents 0.16 0.4 0.02 0.36
Proﬁt rate of
Entrants 0.11 1.5 -0.12 0.98
smaller than net entry rates. On the other hand, proﬁt rates for entrants are smaller
than for incumbents, but they are also more variable.
3.2 Expected proﬁts
Rational ﬁrms will form their expectations about expected post–entry proﬁts tak-
ing into account all the available information. Post–entry proﬁts are unobservable
at the moment of the entry decision, but a rational ﬁrm will take into account:
• Information reﬂecting performance of the market in the past.
• A priori knowledge of the characteristics of the market
We propose a rational expectations estimator for expected proﬁts, based on a
measure of success:
ρjt = πjt −¯ πt (5)
whereρjt isthedeviationofproﬁtsinindustry j(πjt)fromaverageproﬁtsinperiod
t (¯ πt).
InAppendixA we show thatexpected proﬁtscan beapproximatedby theﬁtted
values of the following regression model:
ρjt = λ(L)ρj,t−1 +φZjt +vjt, (6)
where λ(l) is a lag operator, Zjt is a vector of exogenous variables, φ is a vector
of unknown coefﬁcients that are estimated and vjt is a stochastic perturbation. In
other words, current success is supposed to depend on lagged success and a set of
exogenous variables. The ﬁtted values of the dependent variableof this regression
are a proxy for the values of the latent variable, that is expected proﬁts at time t.
We recover expected proﬁts from our success measure by means of equation (5).
9Table 4: Types of ﬁrms
Incumbent Potential entrants
Owned by residents Owned by residents
Domestically based
Owned by non–residents Owned by non–residents
Owned by residents Owned by residents
Foreign based
Owned by non–residents Owned by non–residents
3.3 Barriers to entry
We need to construct variables that approximate the non–observable variablelimit
proﬁts, bj, or entry barriers. This is usually done by using information related to
market structure, sunk costs, advertising orR&D .
Evidence from previous empirical studies show that limit proﬁts are relatively
high (in average 15 to 20 % over costs). Regarding the choice of variables, previ-
ous studies show that only capital requirements and sunk costs show the expected
signs.
Ourinformationallowedus toconstruct aseries ofvariables relatedtopossible
entry barriers, but as we will see in later sections, only sunk costs, cost advantages
by incumbents, ﬁrm age and participation of foreign ﬁrms seemed to have any ex-
planatory power.
3.4 Firm type
Firms can be classiﬁed according to three criteria: ownership, operation (entrant
or incumbent) and location (domestic or foreign). Therefore we have 8 different
situations, presented in Table 4.
Foreignbasedﬁrmscan challengedomesticbased ﬁrmsonlybyimports. Inthe
table we assume that ﬁrms owned by residents can be located outside of the coun-
try and compete through imports with domestic and foreign domestically located
ﬁrms. We will concentrate only on domestically based ﬁrms and their ownership,
distinguishing between incumbent and entrant ﬁrms.
104 The empirical model of entry
In this section we present the estimation of the model of entry. We start by esti-
mating expected proﬁts by means of the predicted values of a dynamic model of
proﬁtabilityfor each industry. In a second step we estimate the model of entry us-
ing the expected proﬁts estimated in the ﬁrst step. In this second step we take into
account that the value of the dependent variable, net entry rates, is left censored.
4.1 Expected Proﬁts
Using a panel data set with informationabout proﬁts for the period 1981-1988 for
all industries we estimate the reduced–form equation (6). We also include as an
explanatoryvariabletheparticipationoftheindustryinthetotalgrossvalueofpro-
duction of the period, as well as a full set of ﬁxed effects. Given our time series
span, we decided to truncate the lag structure for the success measure (ρ) at three
periods. The estimated coefﬁcients for the lagged value of proﬁts are assumed to
be the same across all industries, and therefore these coefﬁcients have to be inter-
preted as an average elasticity of currentsuccess with respect to past success. This
assumption would probably be too strong if we were trying to explain the persis-
tence of proﬁts, which is likely to be quite heterogeneous across industries, but re-
call that we are just tryingto proxyexpected proﬁtsforour entry equation. The re-
sults are shown in Table 5. The dynamics suggested by this equation is stationary.
A simulation of this dynamic behavior can be obtained by assuming any level of
the deviation from average proﬁts. Suppose that this deviation is 0.50, and ignore
the effect of the participation of the industry in total gross value of production of
theperiod. InFigure1itis shownthatproﬁtswillconvergequitefast totheirlong–
run level. In approximately eight years the deviation from the long–term level of
proﬁts is negligible.
4.2 Entry response in the presence of foreign ﬁrms
In this section we analyze how entry conditions change when there are foreign
ﬁrms present in the industry. We estimate the model of entry without assuming
that the intercept and the slope coefﬁcients are the same. In the next section we
will allow for different behavior of domestic and foreign ﬁrms.
As dependent variable we use the entry measure discussed in section 3.1. As








S),anda series ofproxiesforbarrierstoentry. These








Participation of the industry 2.91
in total gross value of production (1.38)
R2 / Adjusted R2 0.69 / 0.60
F[79,296] 8.166
aA full set of 75 ﬁxed effects were included in the regres-
sion. Most of them were signiﬁcantly different from 0 at a 5 %
level.
bStandard deviations are presented below in brackets. All













: exportorientation of the industry, measured as the proportionof exports



















: A dummy variable constructed as follows: if the ratio of energy consump-
tionoversalesissmallerforincumbentsthanforentrantsthenittakesavalue























: percentage of gross value of production by surviving foreign ﬁrms







: percentage of patent royalties paid by surviving foreign ﬁrms that en-
tered after 1973.
We present the estimation by the ordinary least squares method and the Tobit
procedure, as proposed in Tobin (1958). The latter is appropriate for the case of
left truncation of the dependent variable, as in the case of our entry measure. As
it is usual in entry models, there is an important proportion of the variability of
entry that is not accounted by our proposed explanatory variables. There are a se-
ries of external factors inﬂuencing the entry decision that we are not taking into
account, such as alternative proﬁtable activities or government regulation. Never-
theless, our model shows a goodness of ﬁt of 60 % as showed by the adjusted-R2
statistic, whichrepresents afairlyhighexplanatorypowerwhen comparedtosimi-
larstudies. We found two industries that were behaving as outliers in the proposed
model. These (3419paperandcardboardproductsand 3691clayproductsforcon-
struction)areindustrieswitha largedispersioninthe numberofﬁrms, witha small
14Table 6: Estimation of the entry equation. Dependent variable is entry rate

















































































R2/ Adjusted R2 0.65/0.59
F[12,61] 9.332
Log Likelihood 161.5
aStandard deviations are presented in brackets below the estimated coefﬁcients. All estimated
coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantlydifferent from zero at a 5 % level, except when noted
bFitted values of the proﬁt model.
15average size of ﬁrms, with an important proportion of family or hand-craft busi-
nesses andahighdegreeofproductdifferentiation. Weincludedadummyvariable










1). The results are shown in Table 6.
The estimated coefﬁcients are the same for the OLS and TOBIT speciﬁcation,








S) have a signiﬁcant and positive impact on entry, as we
were expecting from economic theory. The coefﬁcient for this variable can be in-
terpreted as the speed of entry according to our speciﬁcation. The value of the
estimated coefﬁcient is similar to the speed of entry estimated for industrialized
countries, which range from 8 to 15 % (see Cable and Schwalbach, 1991).
Average age of ﬁrms (
A
G
E) has a negative effect on entry. Older ﬁrms seem to
be more apt to raise signiﬁcant barriers to entry, taking advantage of their knowl-
edgeaboutexisting regulatorymechanisms. This is also thegroupwiththe highest
levels of foreigninvestment survivingfromthe period ofimport–substitution. Itis
also a group where patent protection, product differentiation, brand loyalties and







T) has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on entry. We
did not have an a priori expectation about the sign of this coefﬁcient. Those in-
dustries which sell a signiﬁcant proportion of their output in international markets
raise smaller barriers to entry domestically. On the other hand, it has to be taken
into account that there are strong expectations about a deepening of the trade lib-
eralization process and increased economic integration 8. This implies that indus-
tries which are more apt to compete regionally are more able to attract resources
and therefore, show higher entry rates.
Sunk costs are, according to economic theory, important sources of entry bar-











2) on total sales. The ra-
tio of machinery capital stock to total sales shows a positive effect on entry, while
the ratio of non-machinery on total sales shows a negative and smaller effect. In-
vestment in machinery has probably not the nature of a sunk investment, but of a
recoverable ﬁxed cost. Instead non–machinery investment may be gathering both
recoverable and non–recoverable investment committed to entry.
We also tried to include variables gathering information about structural dif-
ferences between incumbents and entrants. A variablethat turned outsigniﬁcantly




T.We interpretthis variable as giving us in-
7We triedto include othervariables but they didnotshow any signiﬁcantimpact on entry, such
as economies of scale or advertising.
8On January 1st 1994 a custom union called MERCOSUR starts between Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay.






advantages are not present. This variable may be also giving information about
new and improved technologies that entrants may be able to use, reducing there-
fore the advantage that incumbents may have, as they are committed to older or
inferior technologies.




K, giving information about the uncertainty
that potential entrants are facing in terms of the variability of proﬁts. According
to our estimation, the more variable are proﬁts in previous periods the less likely
is entry in the current period.























S. The trade liberalization pro-
cess started in Uruguay around 1973, and in our estimations this fact turned out to
be important. If we include these same variables without discriminating foreign
ﬁrms from the pre–1973 and post–1973 periods, all the variables related to for-
eign ﬁrms loose their explanatory power on entry. It is interesting to compare the
entry behavior of industries with old ﬁrms and high foreign capital participation,
and young export oriented industries. The latter seem to present high proﬁt op-
portunities and lower entry barriers. Our last three variables gather partially this






S, the higher the entry rate. Foreign ﬁrms seem to have a
smallerdeterringeffecton entrythandomesticﬁrms, thehighertheirmarketshare,
the more dynamic in terms of ﬁrm ﬂows is the industry considered.
This operates in the opposite direction if we also consider exports. The share










N, has a negative effect
on entry. Foreign ﬁrms seem to have advantages in terms of exports, which serves
as an entry deterring strategy.









a negative effect on entry.
In short, our estimation shows that there exist a series of systematic forces that
facilitate or impede entry, speeding up or delaying the response of potential en-
trants to the scope of excess proﬁts in different industries. Old industries, in terms
of the average age of the ﬁrms operating in them, show higher entry barriers, may-
be indicating that old ﬁrms are able to reposition themselves in front of increased
entry threats and raise signiﬁcant obstacles to entrants. Export oriented industries
seem also more akin to new proﬁt opportunities, attracting signiﬁcantly more en-
try than domestic oriented industries. Foreignﬁrms act signiﬁcantly differentthan
domestic ﬁrms, and this shows when we consider their market shares in domestic
17and foreign markets, as well as their technological capabilities.
4.3 Foreign and domestic ﬁrms as potential entrants
How differently operate foreign and domestic ﬁrms as potential entrants? This
question is very hard to answer, since we cannot observe potential entrant behav-
ior directly. But potential entry behavior can be inferred from actual entry behav-
ior 9. In this section we decompose the sample into foreign and domestic entry
rates in different industries, and estimate a version of equation 2. We did not ﬁnd
signiﬁcant differences in the intercept of the regression equation for foreign and
domestic ﬁrms, but we found some interesting results with respect to the slopes.
Some of the independent variables that were used in the general entry model were
dropped because they turned out to be insigniﬁcant. Left–censoring was assumed
to be present when there was a total entry rate of zero, or when the entry rate for
foreignﬁrmswas zero, but notwhenonly theentryrateofdomestic rateswas zero.
The reasoning behind this assumption is that foreign entry rate is much lower than
domestic entry rates, and thereforethe probabilityof observing in a given industry
positive foreign net entry simultaneously with net exit of domestic ﬁrms is very
low, but it is more plausible that for a given industry positive domestic net entry
occurs at the same time that net exit of foreign ﬁrms occurs.
In table 7 we present the results of estimation. The results in this case are also
consistent with our expectations, and conﬁrm what we have observed in the gen-
eral model. We dropped some independent variables used there that turned out








S, were not different for domestic and foreign ﬁrms,







T. In both cases the results are the same than for the
general entry model.
Instead the effect of the average age of incumbent ﬁrms,
A
G
E, on foreign and
domesticentrantsissigniﬁcantlydifferent. Inbothcasestheolderincumbentﬁrms,
the less entry, but this has a stronger effect on foreign ﬁrms, as shown by the es-
timated coefﬁcients. If average age of ﬁrms is correlated with the ability of ﬁrms
of deterring entry, this has a stronger impact on foreign ﬁrms than on domestic
ﬁrms. Capital mobility may be easier or faster for foreign ﬁrms, permitting them
to reassign resources in those industries where thereare better proﬁtopportunities.
Instead domestic ﬁrms may be subject to local rigidities and may be more ﬂexible
to move between economic activities.
9See Geroski (1991b) for a discussion on the search of observables related to unobserved po-
tential entry.
18Table 7: Foreign and Domestic ﬁrms as potential entrants. Dependent variable is
entry rate



















































R2/ Adjusted R2 0.24/0.20
F[12,61] 5.57
Log Likelihood 98.56
aStandard deviations are presented in brackets below the estimated coefﬁcients. The coefﬁ-
cients are signiﬁcant at the 5 % except otherwise noted.
bFitted values of the proﬁt model.
cSigniﬁcant at the 10 % level
dNon signiﬁcant at the 10% level.




K, is also different for domestic and for-
eign potential entrants. In the case of the OLS estimation the coefﬁcient is signiﬁ-
cantly different from 0 only for domestic ﬁrms, but in the case of the TOBIT esti-
mation, both coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at the 5 % level , and have opposite signs.
Proﬁt risk reduces entry in the case of domestic ﬁrms, but this does not seem to
be the case for foreign ﬁrms. Usually ﬁnancial resources are deeper for foreign
ﬁrms, and industries with high proﬁt variabilitymay be moreattractive to increase
market shares faster.
Summing up, domestic and foreign ﬁrms seem to have substantial differences
also when they face the prospects of entering different industries. In general we
ﬁnd that foreign ﬁrms are more ﬂexible in their response to proﬁt opportunities, or
may have better ﬁnancial resources to respond to proﬁt opportunities.
4.4 Entry barriers height index
We conclude by presenting an index of barriers to entry and its relation to the dif-
ferent types of industries with respect to the participation of foreign ﬁrms. The
index of barriers to entry is constructed by multiplying the estimated coefﬁcients
of the entry model by the value of the explanatory variables explaining long–run
proﬁt levels and normalizing this measure to lie between zero and one, using the
estimated coefﬁcients of the general entry model (TOBIT estimation) of section
4.2. We divide the sample in industries with foreign participation and industries
with no foreign participation. This plot summarizes nicely some of our results.
We plot the entry barriers index against average age. The results are shown in
Figure2. We canobserve twosalient featuresfromthis ﬁgure. First, thereisa high
positive correlation between average age and barriers to entry. Older industries
seem to be able to raise higher barriers to entry.
Ontheotherhand, theindustrieswiththehighestbarrierstoentryareindustries
where there is no participation of post-1973 foreign entrants. It is worth remark-
ing that the oldest industries are nevertheless industries with high participation of
foreign capital, but from the import-substitution period, before 1973. The indus-
tries where those ﬁrms participate show higher patent protection, product differ-
entiation, brand loyalty or scale economies, explaining why these industries may
be able to raise signiﬁcant and credible entry barriers.
It is worth remarking the case of four industries that we have highlighted with
arrows at ﬁgure 2. Two of these industries present fairly high entry barriers, but
young ﬁrms. These are the textile and the non–specialized machinery industry.
These two industries are fairly important in gross value added and clearly export
oriented. This may explain why the presence of foreign post-1973 ﬁrms is impor-
20Figure 2:
21tant. In general foreign post–1973 entrants seem to prefer young industries with
intermediate height of entry barriers. In the ﬁgure we can see that the youngest
industries with the lowest entry barriers are usually preferred by domestic ﬁrms.
There are only two exceptions, which are marked again by arrows. These two in-
dustries markedwith arrows are also industries withyoung ﬁrms but also with low
entry barriers. These are the ﬁsheries and leather products industry. The presence
of foreignﬁrms may be explained in this case by means of the dynamic and export
oriented character of these industries.
5 Conclusion
Trade liberalizationprocesses usually cause the reallocation of resources fromim-
port–competing towards export–oriented industries. Domestic and foreign ﬁrms
may face different restrictions and proﬁt opportunities.
In this paper we have estimated a model of entry to investigate the determi-
nants of entry for domestic and foreign ﬁrms. We study the manufacturing indus-
try of a small developing economy with increased international exposure. There
are some studies for industrialized countries that show that both the behavior as
incumbents, as well as the response to proﬁt opportunitiesof domestic and foreign
ﬁrms diverges. This is, instead, a less well studied issue for developing countries.
The results obtained are of two types. First, our estimated coefﬁcients for the
speed of entry and the height of barriers to entry are very similar to equivalent es-
timations for developed countries. The age of incumbent ﬁrms, incumbent cost
advantages and sunk costs are negatively associated with entry, as expected. Sec-
ond, we established that the degree of international exposure of industries is a rel-
evant factor in determining the speed and value of entry. Export orientation of in-
dustries is positively associated with entry. Those industries still protected and not
exposed to internationalcompetition, show a lower rate ofentry and ﬁrmturnover.
Industrieswithlargercohortsofolderﬁrms,survivingfromtheimportsubstitution
period, and mainly oriented towards internal markets, seem to be industries with
the highest barriers to entry. In these industries it seems that traditional ﬁrms have
been repositioning themselves to be able to adopt credible entry deterring strate-
gies and keep their market shares. Furthermore,domestic and foreign ﬁrms acting
as incumbents show a different impact on entry. Industries where foreign ﬁrms
have larger domestic shares are usually industries with better proﬁt opportunities,
as shown by higher entry rates, but if we include exports into the picture, indus-
tries with a higher share of gross production by foreign ﬁrms are industries better
protected against entry.
22We complete the picture by studying the differences of domestic and foreign
ﬁrms as potential entrants. Foreign ﬁrms, may be due to better ﬁnancial prospects
or more ﬂexibility to move resources from one economic activity to another, are
more responsive to entry deterring strategies by well established incumbents, but
prefer industries with higher proﬁt variability.
Summingup, the process of industrial restructuringcaused by trade liberaliza-
tionhas implieda repositioningofdomestic and foreignﬁrms, especially inexport
oriented industries. Foreign ﬁrms seem to have targeted industries with younger
ﬁrms and high proﬁt variability.
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24Appendix
A The proﬁt model
In this section we follow the model proposed by Geroski and Jacquemin (1988)
for the persistence of proﬁts. We model changes in success (ρ) as driven by sys-
tematic forces E (actual and potential entry) and unsystematic forces µ (“luck”).
The equation proposed to explain changes in success,  ρt is the following:
 ρt = θ +
∞ 
j=0
βjEt−j +γρt−1 +µt (7)
For stationarity it is assumed that −1 <γ<0. It is also expected that βj ≤ 0 for
all j. E is also endogenous and can be modeled as:
Et = φ +
∞ 
j=1
αjρt−j + t (8)
which corresponds to an error–correctionmodel of entry. Past success attracts en-
try reducing the scope for excess proﬁts. Furthermore, µt and  t are i.i.d. random
variables with zero mean and constant and ﬁnitevariance. Substituting(8) into (7)
and restricting the lag structure to three periods, we obtain:
ρt = λ0 +λ1ρt−1 +λ2ρt−2 +λ3ρt−3 +vt (9)
where,




λ1 = 1+γ +β0α1
λ2 = α1β1 +α2β0
λ3 = α2β2 +α3β1
which is the reduced–form proﬁt model that we estimate as equation (6).
B Description of the information
WeusetheCensusofManufacturersfortheyear1988, surveyedbytheDGEC (Di-
recci´ on General de Estad´ ısticas y Censos). The universe is all establishments with
25more than 5 workers. It corresponds to 1616 establishments belonging to 1382
ﬁrms, existing in 1988. To construct the time series of proﬁts we used the Annual
Survey of Industries from the DGEC.
Table 8 summarizes the main information about the sample. There are three
Table 8: Summary information of the sample
Expanded Sample Sample Data
Value Added 1864.9 1614.5
Employment 171.4 124.3
Establishments
(Activity Class Unit) 5440.0 1616.0
Firms 6256 1382
deﬁnitions of production units from where the data is generated:
Production plant: This is the physical place where production takes place. This
variable is uniquely associated with geographical location. It can be formed
by a set of establishments with different industrial activities.
Establishments: It is a ﬁrm or a part of a ﬁrm that independently engages only or
mainly in an economic activity located or generated in a geographical site,
and where value added can be computed.
Activity Class Unit: It is the aggregation of establishments of a single ﬁrm that
share the same line of production (5-digit industry). This is the unit of ob-
servation of the Industrial Census.
Firm: Itis the unitofobservationand it is formedby a set ofActivityClass Units.
26